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The European Union’s regulations affect how business is conducted and consumers and the 
environment protected in parts of the world far beyond its borders.  Moreover, the external 
impact of its regulations informs understandings of the EU as a global actor.  This article makes 
three main arguments.  First, the EU’s regulatory influence varies systematically across different 
forms of regulatory interaction: regulatory competition and different forms of regulatory 
cooperation.  The form of regulatory interaction, therefore, is a critical intervening variable 
between the EU’s regulatory power resources and its influence.  Second, within the different 
forms of regulatory cooperation the EU’s influence varies in line with expectations derived from 
the literature. But, third, the magnitude of the EU’s influence seems to be considerably less in 
regulatory cooperation than suggested by the literature on regulatory competition; a finding that 
reinforces the first argument. The article also introduces the rest of the special issue. 
 
 
Both in the academic literature and in the media the European Union is commonly characterized 
as an influential regulator well beyond its borders. This depiction is informed primarily by 
examples of regulatory competition in which firms or governments unilaterally adjust to or adopt 
EU rules.  This literature has identified critical regulatory power resources -- a large market; 
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sophisticated regulatory capability; and stringent regulations -- which the EU possesses in 
abundance.  Much of the literature examining the EU’s participation in regulatory cooperation 
also finds evidence of influence, but different authors understand influence differently.  
Moreover, in contrast to the literature on regulatory competition, the regulatory cooperation 
literature finds little evidence of the EU influencing the regulations of other states; the ‘gold 
standard’ of regulatory influence.  This observation, which is surprising given the EU’s 
considerable regulatory power resources, has gone largely unexplained beyond individual cases. 
Supported by the three empirical articles in the special issue, this article makes three 
main arguments.  First, the EU’s regulatory influence varies systematically across different forms 
of regulatory interaction: regulatory competition and different forms of regulatory cooperation -- 
power-based bargaining with the ability to exclude others from the EU’s market; power-based 
bargaining without the ability to exclude others from the EU’s market; and rule-mediated 
negotiation.  The form of regulatory interaction, therefore, is a critical intervening variable 
between the EU’s regulatory power resources and its influence.  Second, within the different 
forms of regulatory cooperation the EU’s influence varies in line with expectations derived from 
the literature. But, third, the magnitude of the EU’s influence seems to be considerably less in 
regulatory cooperation than suggested by the literature on regulatory competition; a finding that 
reinforces the first argument. 
The special issue’s three empirical articles – on regulatory cooperation in ‘new 
generation’ preferential trade agreements (Young); addressing greenhouse gas emissions from 
aviation (Birchfield); and the Maritime Labor Convention (Kissack) – illustrate the argument by 
representing the three major forms of regulatory cooperation.  In addition, each article captures 
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within-case variation – among partners (Young) or over time (Birchfield, Kissack) – which 
permits analysis of the impact of relative power on EU influence.   
The two more conceptual articles by Newman and Posner and by Damro provide riffs on 
the central theme.  Newman and Posner present a framework that draws on the same building 
blocks and similarly focus on forms of regulatory interaction; what they refer to the EU’s 
external policy strategies, such as creating mutual recognition regimes or establishing first-mover 
advantage.  Rather than take these forms of interaction as exogenous, they seek to explain 
variation in the form of interaction. In part informed by the contributions to the special issue, 
Damro presents a ‘conceptual stock-taking exercise’ that attempts to clarify important aspects of 
the Market Power Europe (MPE) framework and reflects upon ways in which the 
conceptualization may offer empirical and analytical contributions that improve our 
understanding of the EU as a global regulator and, more generally, as a power.   
This article begins by establishing how pervasive the perception of the EU as an 
influential regulator beyond its borders is and how this view informs depictions of the EU as a 
global actor.  It then discusses the existing literature on the EU as a global regulator, highlighting 
the variation in how influence is understood and the fragmentation of the literature. In doing so, 
it makes the case for treating influence as an ordinal variable.  Drawing on the existing 
regulatory cooperation literature, the article develops the argument that the utility of different 
regulatory power resources varies across forms of regulatory interaction: competition and forms 
of cooperation.  The article then illustrates the argument while introducing the empirical 
contributions. It concludes by drawing out the implications for the analysis of the EU’s 
regulatory influence and by introducing the rest of the volume. 
 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
4 
 
Regulation and the EU as a global actor 
There is a broad consensus that the EU is a regulatory ‘great power’ (Drezner 2007: 36; Sapir 
2007: 12; Scott 2014: 87-8; Vogel 2012: 16; see also Lavanex 2014: 885). Bradford (2012: 5) 
claims that the EU is ‘the predominant regulator of global commerce’ (see also Jacoby and 
Meunier 2010: 306; Posner 2009: 692).  In the late 2000s the Commission (2007:5) noted that 
the EU was ‘emerging as a global rule-maker.’  The impression of the EU’s regulatory influence 
is echoed in the press, with, for example, The New York Times (19 October 2013: A1) calling the 
EU a ‘regulatory superpower’ (see also the Wall Street Journal, 23 April 2002 and 26 October 
2007).  That the EU’s regulations have effects beyond the borders of the single market is, 
therefore, not in doubt.  
 This external impact of its regulations is central to depictions of the EU as an 
international actor (see also Müller et al 2014: 1103).  It is a crucial component of the EU’s 
international ‘presence’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 27).  Cooper (2012) contends that ‘the 
main output of the Brussels machine are rules that govern trade and that set standards for 
consumer protection, for the environment, for competition, etc. … If the power to make rules is 
power, then Brussels, in a modest way, is also a power.’  In addition, the EU’s ability to shape 
international agreements to reflect its regulations is often equated with ‘goal attainment’ in the 
literature assessing the EU’s ‘performance’ in international negotiations (Dee 2013: 49-50; 
Jørgensen et al 2011: 599).  The EU’s regulatory impact, therefore, is a crucial component of 
why it matters in international relations. 
 For others, the EU’s efforts to promote its regulatory choices beyond its borders reveal 
what type of international actor it is.  The EU’s coercive promotion of its regulations has led 
some to label it a ‘normative hegemon’ (Laïdi 2007: 2-3) and even an ‘empire’ (Zielonka 2008). 
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Alternatively, the EU’s championing of multilateral environmental agreements and promotion of 
core labor standards is often cited as evidence of the EU being a normative power (Kelemen 
2010: 338; Orbie 2011: 160).  Damro (2012: 682; this volume), by contrast, contends that the EU 
is ‘best understood as a market power Europe that exercises its power through the externalization 
of economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures.’  There is, therefore, 
despite important differences of emphasis, considerable agreement that the EU’s rules have 
significant influence beyond its borders and that this influence shapes understandings of the EU 
as a global actor. 
 
Limitations of the literature: Operationalization and Fragmentation 
While there is no denying that the EU’s rules matter well beyond its borders, the existing 
literature has two reinforcing shortcomings that blur the significance of this observation.  First, 
different authors understand regulatory influence in different ways.  That is, they effectively, if 
implicitly, operationalize the dependent variable differently.  Second, while the literature on 
regulatory cooperation has recently begun to examine explicitly variation in EU influence and to 
consider the importance of the relevant international constellation of power and preferences, it is 
highly fragmented (see also Müller and Falkner 2014: 1); advancing explanations with respect to 
single or closely related cases.   
 
The varied operationalization of influence 
Different authors understand what constitutes regulatory influence very differently.  For some 
the focus is the EU’s impact on the behavior of firms.  Firms that want to export goods to or 
provide services in the EU may need to change their practices to secure market access.  Having 
done so, they may opt to comply with EU standards throughout their global operations (see 
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Bradford 2012; Selin and VanDeveer 2006: 14; Vogel 2012: 280; and this is what particularly 
occupies the press).      
For many, if not most, authors regulatory influence is equated with other states changing 
their rules to align them with those of the EU (Müller and Falkner 2014: 2; Selin and VanDeveer 
2006: 14; see also Müller et al 2014: 1103).  This is the central focus of the literature on 
regulatory competition; ‘trading up’ (Bradford 2012; Selin and VanDeveer 2006; Vogel 1995).  
It is also the assumption of much of the literature on the EU as a global actor mentioned above.  
In addition, much of the literature on international regulatory cooperation is also concerned with 
the question of which state’s regulation is adopted as the common one when harmonization 
occurs (see Büthe and Mattli 2011: 9; Dobbin et al 2007: 450; Koenig-Archibugi 2010: 408; 
Krasner 1991; Simmons 2001).  Thus getting other states to align their rules with its – 
‘exporting’ its rules -- is arguably the ‘gold standard’ of European regulatory influence. 
Other authors also focus on state behavior, but identify influence in the EU getting the 
other party to make adjustments to its rules, but not adopt EU rules.  In the literature this takes 
two principal forms.  One is the promotion of international standards of which the EU approves 
(Müller et al 2014: 1109; Young this volume).  The other form involves prompting changes that 
reduce the adverse effects of foreign rules on EU firms, such as by getting states to accept EU 
rules as equivalent in effect to their own (Bach and Newman 2007: 839; Newman and Posner 
this volume; Posner 2009: 674-6; 687; Young this volume).  In both forms, the EU influences 
others’ rules, but does not export its own.   
Other scholars have identified the EU’s influence in shaping multilateral agreements.  
The EU is described as ‘exporting’ (Kelemen 2010: 341; Newman and Posner this volume), 
‘externalizing’ (Damro 2012: 686), and ‘up-loading’ (Smith 2010: 937) its rules. Some have 
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found evidence of the EU successfully ‘uploading’ its regulations into international standard 
setting bodies, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) (Kissack 2011: 657; Tortell et 
al 2009: 125); the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Porter 2011: 80); and the 
Basel Committee (Quaglia 2014a).  Even when the EU up-loads its regulations into international 
standards, other states do not necessarily incorporate those standards into their national rules 
(Kissack 2011: 658; Quaglia 2014a: 328).  Thus shaping international standards does not 
necessarily translate into changes in state behavior.   
Other authors highlight the EU’s impact on specific steps that lead to an international 
agreement, such as setting the agenda (Birchfield this volume; Kelemen 2010: 342-4; Newman 
and Posner this volume; Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008: 36) or getting other actors to change 
their positions (Kelemen 2010: 344; Kissack this volume).  Yet others (e.g., van Schaik 2013: 
111) identify EU influence in its ability to block the adoption of rival standards.  The existing 
literature, therefore, defines the EU’s regulatory influence in a variety of ways; it is effectively 
operationalized differently.   
The tendency in the literature is to treat these different operationalizations of influence 
discreatly and each in a binary fashion.  The EU demonstrates the particular form of influence or 
(usually implicitly) does not, and other understandings are not explicitly considered.  Arguably it 
is more appropriate to treat the different operationalizations as different values of influence that 
differ considerably in terms of how difficult they are to realize.  It is easier to affect the behavior 
of firms than the policies of states.  It is easier to get states to adopt international standards rather 
than European rules because they are more widely accepted and tend to be less demanding 
(Müller et al 2014: 1109). It is easier to block a rival rule than have one’s own adopted as an 
international standard. It is easier to secure a modest change than a radical one.  It is easier to 
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influence an agreement than to get others to implement and enforce it. In addition, some forms of 
influence may be prior to others.  For instance, agenda setting and/or shaping the preferences of 
others may enable the EU to influence an international agreement, which in turn is prior to 
getting states to change their policies as a result of implementing it.  Failure to acknowledge such 
differences about what constitutes influence has muddied the analytical waters.  Treating the 
different manifestations of impact as different values of influence (see Box 1) converts influence 
from a fragmented, binary variable to a single, ordinal one, which facilitates comparison among 
cases. This is the approach adopted in this special issue. 
 
INSERT BOX 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Belated and fragmented attention to variance in influence 
A common point of departure in any new field of study is establishing that the subject is worthy 
of study.  This leads to an understandable tendency to focus on and enumerate instances of the 
EU’s regulatory impact (see, for instance, Bradford 2012: 30; Damro 2012: 694; Kelemen and 
Vogel 2010: 428; Vogel 2012: 90; 170).
2
  No author claims that the EU influences all firms’ 
behavior or all states’ regulations all of the time. Many authors acknowledge explicitly that it 
does not, but those instances have only recently been included explicitly in analyses.  
Consequently, the existing literature is dominated by examples of the EU’s influence (however 
understood).  When inferences are drawn from this skewed set of cases, the extent of the EU’s 
influence is exaggerated.     
An emphasis on examples of the EU’s regulatory influence also has the pernicious effect 
of inhibiting explanations of the extent and limits of that influence.  Establishing how the EU 
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causes others to change their ways requires analysis of examples of both success and failure so as 
to be able to identify those factors that correlate with the different outcome.  Some of the recent 
literature on regulatory cooperation has begun to do just that (Groen et al 2012; Newman and 
Posner this volume; Oberthür and Rabitz 2014; Posner 2009; Qualia 2014).  It is on this literature 
that this article draws in the next section. 
Much of this literature, however, has focused on individual cases or on variation within a 
particular issue area (see also Müller and Falkner 2014: 1).
 3
  Such a focus on closely related 
cases has methodological merit because it facilitates isolating the significance of particular 
variables by keeping others constant.  The same approach is adopted in the empirical articles in 
this special issue.  The disadvantage of this tight focus, however, is that it obscures the relevance 
of broader factors.  In particular, it masks how the form of regulatory interaction refracts the 
EU’s regulatory power resources.  
 
Regulatory interaction and the imperfect fungibility of regulatory power resources 
The global regulation literature identifies two broad forms of regulatory interaction: policy 
diffusion, in which convergence occurs through one state aligning its policies with another’s; and 
regulatory cooperation, in which alignment comes about through a process of negotiation.
4
  
Within each of these broad categories are several different forms of interaction.  Because of its 
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issue-specific focus, the literature on the EU’s regulatory influence overlooks the differences 
among these avenues of influence.  This is problematic, because, as the global regulation 
literature suggests, different regulatory power resources matter more in each.   
Although policy diffusion can occur as the result of several different processes (Dobbin 
et al 2007: 452; Koenig-Archibugi 2010; Lazer 2006: 456), the form of regulatory diffusion that 
gets by far the most attention in the EU-as-a-global-regulator literature is regulatory competition.  
The emphasis in the EU literature is primarily on the ‘race to the top’/‘trading-up’ (Vogel 1995; 
see also Bradford 2012: 30; Selin and VanDeveer 2006: 14).  The logic is that foreign firms, 
having adapted their product or practices in order to gain access to the EU’s valuable market, 
may lobby successfully their home governments to adopt comparable regulations in order to 
offset the costs of complying with competing requirements and/or to gain advantage over 
domestically oriented competitors (Bradford 2012: 5; Vogel 1995).  Thus the size (value) of the 
EU’s market, the stringency of its rules and (implicitly) its capacity to enforce them are the key 
factors affecting the EU’s influence through regulatory competition.  Although Vogel (1995) put 
considerable emphasis on the factors that condition whether trading-up occurs, there have been 
few explicit studies of failures of trading-up (Princen 2004; Young 2003).  The resulting 
tendency to focus on successful cases has also fostered the impression that the EU is particularly 
influential and the assumption that its regulatory power resources translate relatively smoothly 
into influence (see, for example, Bradford 2012).   
The existing literature on the EU’s experience of regulatory cooperation, while also 
tending to accentuate the positive, is much more alive to the limits of EU influence than the 
literature dealing with regulatory competition.  Regulatory cooperation occurs through either 
power-based bargaining between states outside institutional frameworks or rule-mediated 
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negotiations within international organizations (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 19; Simmons 2001: 598-
9; see also Newman and Posner this volume).  The literature on regulatory cooperation suggests 
that different power resources have different utilities in these different types of interaction.  The 
tendency of the regulatory cooperation literature to focus on individual or closely related cases, 
however, has masked the implications of this insight. 
The regulatory cooperation literature has focused on the same regulatory power resources 
as the regulatory competition literature: market size; rule stringency; and regulatory capacity.  
Because regulatory cooperation implies strategic interaction and because the EU is an 
international organization as well as an international actor, there is also an issue about the EU’s 
ability to pursue a common position; to be internally cohesive (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 
2014: 969; Van Schaik 2013: 176).  The existence of an EU rule, however, significantly eases 
the problem of cohesiveness (Quaglia 2014b; Young 2002).   Regulatory cooperation authors 
have also been much more explicit in considering how the EU’s power and preferences relate to 
those of other key actors. 
The critical starting assumption in the literature on regulatory cooperation is that each 
party would prefer its own standard to be adopted as the common one, as this brings benefits 
without the costs of adjustment (see Büthe and Mattli 2011: 12; Drezner 2007: 32).  Certainly 
where the EU has existing rules, which is usually the case, the EU is assumed to want regulatory 
cooperation to occur on its own terms (see Damro 2012: 686; Kelemen 2010: 341; Smith 2010: 
937).   
When regulatory cooperation takes place outside formal institutions, the form of 
cooperation is determined by bargaining power, not least because of the distributional 
implications of the choice of standard (Drezner 2007: 5; Krasner 1991: 336).  Bargaining power 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
12 
 
reflects which party has the better alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA), which in turn 
reflects the distribution of costs and benefits stemming from their interdependence (Keohane and 
Nye 2001: 9; Putnam 1988: 442).  The distribution of costs and benefits associated with 
interdependence are, in turn, profoundly affected by whether the party with the more stringent 
standard can exclude goods or services that do not comply with that standard from its market 
(Lazer 2006: 460; Young and Wallace 2000: 24-5).  Where exclusion is possible, the party with 
the more stringent rules has the superior BATNA, as foreign products or service providers are 
excluded from its market and its firms are protected from competition.  When exclusion is not 
possible, the party with the more stringent regulations tends to have a worse BATNA than its 
negotiating partner(s).  Its firms arguably face higher productions costs, and so are less 
competitive, and foreign products are not normally excluded from its market.  Bargaining power, 
therefore, is fundamentally different in the two scenarios. 
Given sufficient enforcement capacity, exclusion is essentially automatic with respect to 
stringent product standards.  Although the single market’s has generally had a liberalizing effect 
on services (Young and Peterson 2014: 141-2), there are a few areas in which the EU’s rules 
apply explicitly to service providers based outside the EU.  The most prominent examples of 
such ‘territorial extension’ (Scott 2014) are in financial services (Dür 2011; Posner 2009); data 
protection (Newman 2008: Princen 2004); and aviation with respect to greenhouse gas emissions 
(Birchfield this volume; Scott 2014).  The larger the excluding party’s market, the greater the 
incentive to secure access to the market (Bach and Newman 2007: 827; Drezner 2007: 35, 51) 
and thus to reach accommodation.  Given the EU’s large market, its generally stringent 
regulations and its considerable regulatory capacity, the EU’s negotiating leverage is formidable 
in power-based bargaining when exclusion is possible. 
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There is, however, a question as to how much of an adjustment cost foreign firms are 
willing to incur in order to secure the benefit of greater market access. It is possible that if the 
EU’s regulations are too stringent, the costs of adjustment would outweigh the benefits of 
cooperation (Drezner 2007: 46-7).  Thus stringent rules are a source of negotiating leverage, but 
only up to some tipping point.  This suggests that relative preferences, reflecting the stringency 
of existing standards, matter even when exclusion is possible (see Young this volume). 
The EU’s regulatory power resources are much less potent when exclusion is not 
possible.  The most prominent example of such negotiations are those concerning efforts to 
address climate change.  In this context the EU’s market size matters only to the extent that it is 
part of the problem and its participation is crucial to a solution (McCormick 2007: 158; Oberthür 
2011: 677-8).  Consequently, the EU has used its regulatory capacity and stringent rules for 
demonstration effect and to lend its positions legitimacy, rather than for bargaining leverage 
(Kelemen 2010: 337; Oberthur and Roche Kelly: 2008: 36).   
The literature on bargaining without exclusion also highlights the importance of the EU’s 
preferences relative to those of other actors and to the status quo. The EU is less likely to affect 
the outcome if it is pushing for change (is ‘reformist’) and is a preference outlier (Groen et al 
2012: 185).  Where the EU’s position is ‘conservative,’ preferring the status quo, the EU’s 
economic importance means others have an incentive to accommodate it in order to secure its 
participation and enhance the significance of the agreement (Oberthür and Rabitz 2013: 2).  In 
addition, the EU’s cohesiveness may be undermined if its negotiating position goes beyond what 
has already been adopted internally (Groen et al 2012: 184).  Thus, for a variety of reasons, when 
exclusion is not possible, stringent standards and a large market do not lend negotiating leverage 
to nearly the same extent as they do when exclusion is possible.   
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The implications for the utility of regulatory power resources are similar within formal, 
state-centric international standard setting bodies, where decision-making is rule mediated.  The 
critical difference is that, although the norm in international standard setting bodies is to seek 
consensus, some can take decisions by voting.  Because the EU’s member states are individually 
members of international standard setting bodies, voting does give the EU greater weight than 
other actors.  That greater weight, however, depends on the EU having a cohesive position 
(Quaglia 2014a: 328; Kissack this volume).  When voting is possible, despite its vote advantage, 
the EU is rarely able on its own to block standards that it does not like, although it need not 
implement them. The EU’s market size, therefore, matters only in the sense that a standard 
implemented by the world’s largest market is more valuable than one that it ignores (Quaglia 
2014a: 328).  In some circumstances, however, the EU may be able to exploit its economic 
weight to influence the preferences of states within the standard setting body, as occurred with 
the Maritime Labor Convention (Kissack this volume).   
Regulatory capacity, in terms of being able to gather and generate information and 
aggregate preferences is particularly important in shaping negotiations in international standard 
setting bodies (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 12-13; King and Narlikar 2003). Stringent rules, however, 
increase the likelihood that the EU will a preference outlier and thus reduce the likelihood that 
agreed international standards will reflect its own (Young 2014).  Thus, ceteris paribus, the EU’s 
regulatory power resources are less significant with respect to rule-mediated standard setting 
than they are in power-based bargaining when exclusion is possible, but somewhat more so than 
in power-based bargaining when it is not. 
The literature on regulatory cooperation, particularly that on bargaining without the 
possibility of exclusion and rule-mediated negotiations, also challenges the assumption that the 
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EU always seeks to export its rules.  Because regulatory cooperation involves strategic 
interaction, the EU at times advances progressive positions that are less extreme than its own 
rules in an effort to increase the likelihood of agreement (Goen et al 2012: 185; Mair 2008: 21-2; 
Van Schaik 2013: 106-8).  Such moderation has been less observed in power-based bargaining 
when exclusion is possible.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect the EU to shy away from 
insisting on harmonization on its terms even when exclusion is possible if the adjustment costs 
are sufficiently high that doing so might scupper an agreement that brings other benefits.  This is 
certainly what seems to be happening in the EU’s ‘new generation’ preferential trade agreements 
(Young this volume).  Thus how the EU’s preferences relate to those of others can affect not just 
its ability to realize its objectives, but also how ambitious those objectives are (Dee 2013: 225; 
Groen et al 2012); whether it even tries to export its rules. 
This discussion of the literature on the EU’s engagement in regulatory cooperation 
prompts three takeaways for the volume.  First, the utility of the EU’s regulatory power 
resources varies systematically depending on the form of regulatory cooperation: whether it is 
power-based bargaining with or without the possibility of exclusion or rule-mediated negotiation. 
This insight has been obscured by the tendency of the literature to focus on individual or closely 
related cases that fall within the same form of regulatory cooperation. Second, how cohesive the 
positions of the EU’s member states are is a live consideration, in a way that it is not when 
dealing with policy diffusion.  Third, explanations of the EU’s influence look beyond the EU’s 
resources to consider how its preferences and power relate to those of other key actors.  The 
significance of these insights is illustrated by the empirical contributions to this volume. 
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Introducing the empirical contributions: Illustrating the argument 
The central argument of this article is that the utility of the EU’s regulatory power resources 
varies systematically across the forms of regulatory cooperation.  The form of regulatory 
cooperation, therefore, is a critical intervening variable.  Each of the three empirical chapters 
falls within one of these forms of regulatory cooperation at any given time.  The new generation 
preferential trade agreements (Young) represent bargaining with exclusion.  The aviation 
emissions case (Birchfield) begins as bargaining without exclusion, but with the EU’s decision to 
incorporate flights outside the EU within the Emissions Trading System (ETS), it becomes 
bargaining with the prospect of exclusion.  The Maritime Labor Convention (Kissack) reflects 
rule-mediated negotiation.  Together, therefore, the three cases permit exploration of the impact 
of the form of regulatory cooperation as an intervening variable. 
The subcases within each of the three empirical chapters capture variation in the EU’s 
relative regulatory resources.  That is, there is within-case variation in the relative power of the 
EU’s partners.  The EU has negotiated preferential trade agreements with countries that differ 
both in their economic size and their regulatory capacity.  In the aviation emissions case the 
EU’s effective power resources increased as a result of creating the possibility of exclusion.  In 
the maritime labor case the EU’s effective power resources increased once it began advancing 
common positions from 2003.  Thus, in addition to capturing within-case variation, the empirical 
articles also represent different ways in which the EU’s relative regulatory resources can vary. 
As the motivating question here is what explains the EU’s ability to influence regulations 
beyond its borders, the presumption is that the EU is seeking change away from the status quo 
towards its preferences.  That is, it has adopted a ‘progressive’ position.  As the literature notes, 
the degree to which the EU is progressive can vary.  It can be amibitious or more moderate.  
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Here an ambitious objective is defined as the EU seeking to secure its ideal oucome, such as 
adoption of its regulatory solution.  In such cases the EU is often a preference outlier.  A more 
moderate position involves the EU adopting a position closer to the status quo than  its ideal 
outcome.  In such instances, its position is more likely to be shared or supported by other actors. 
The assessment of how progressive the EU’s preferences are thus captures how its preferences 
relate both to the status quo and to those of other actors.  The cases capture different levels of 
ambition, with it being least ambitious in the Maritime Labor Convention and most ambitious 
with respect to aviation emissions. 
 The subcases in the empirical articles also capture substantial variation in the degree of 
EU influence.  The most demanding form of influence is found with respect to the EU’s 
preferential trade agreements, where some parties agreed to change some of their rules to 
conform to international standards (Young this volume).  In the Maritime Labor Convention, 
once the EU’s member states began presenting common positions, they collectively shaped 
aspects of the agreement, although even then they were not universally successful and many of 
the important issues had been settled before they began coordinating (Kissack this volume).  In 
addition, that the EU’s member states could enforce the agreed standards caused flag-states and 
ship-owners to moderate their opposition so as to be able to shape the rules.  In the aviation 
emissions case (Birchfield this volume) after the EU decided to include aviation in the ETS other 
key players agreed to put the issue seriously on the agenda of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO).  Prior to the inclusion of aviation in the ETS and prior to EU coordination 
on maritime labor standards, the EU effectively had no influence.  The EU’s degree of influence 
across the cases, therefore, ranges from none through agenda setting and influencing the 
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positions of negotiating partners to securing commitments to adopt international standards 
(convergence). 
The findings from the three empirical chapters (summarized in Table 1) testify to the 
importance of the variation in the EU’s power resources across different forms of regulatory 
cooperation.  The EU’s influence is greatest with respect to power-based bargaining with 
exclusion; prompting some policy convergence in preferential trading agreements.  It is 
particularly telling that the decision to include aviation in the Emissions Trading System, which 
transformed the power-based bargaining from without exclusion to with the possibility of 
exclusion coincided with a sharp increase in the EU’s influence, from none discernable to getting 
the issue on ICAO’s agenda.  As predicted, the EU’s influence within the rule-mediated 
negotiation on the Maritime Labor Convention presents an intermediate case with the EU getting 
its way on some provisions, but not others.  This analysis strongly suggests that scholars should 
take the form of regulatory cooperation seriously when analyzing the EU’s regulatory influence. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In addition, the variation in the EU’s influence within the cases is consistent with 
explanations advanced in the existing literature.  The EU had greater influence in PTAs with 
smaller partners with lower regulatory capacities than with larger partners.  The EU’s influence 
in the Maritime Labor Convention increased once its internal cohesiveness increased as the 
member states began coordinating their positions.  The inclusion of aviation emissions on the 
ICAO agenda came in response to the decision to include aviation in the ETS.  The impact of 
how the EU’s preferences relate to those of others, however, could not be assessed on the basis 
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of the cases.  There is no within-case variation in the cases of aviation and maritime labor.  In the 
PTA cases the EU’s ambition co-varied with the power of partners; seeking more ambitious 
outcomes with the least powerful than the most powerful. Significantly, however, while observed 
variance is in line with expectations about the importance of relative power, the magnitude of 
influence across the board is considerably less that suggested by the common view of the EU as 
a global regulator.  This observation is consistent with the form of regulatory interaction being a 
critical intervening variable.   
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the EU is not as influential a global regulator as many assume.  There 
two principal reasons for this over estimation.  First, is the tendency to focus on examples of 
influence.  This tendency is fostered by different authors understand influence differently.  Each 
of these understandings is implicitly treated as a binary variable.  Moreover, authors tend to find 
some form of influence.  Second, the EU’s considerable regulatory power resources are not 
perfectly fungible across different forms of regulatory interaction, as is typically (if implicitly) 
assumed.  Extrapolating from regulatory competition, where these resources are particularly 
potent, thus creates exaggerated expectations of the EU’s influence in other forms of regulatory 
interaction. 
 This article has argued that the EU’s influence varies systematically across the different 
forms of regulatory cooperation.  The utility of the EU’s regulatory power resources is greatest 
when cooperation takes place through bargaining when foreign products or firms can be 
excluded from the EU’s market.  It is least when bargaining occurs, but exclusion is not possible. 
Rule-meditated negotiation represents an intermediate case.  The empirical chapters in this 
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volume illustrate this argument.  The EU’s influence is greatest – prompting rule change – in 
preferential trade agreements, which have the form of power-based bargain with the prospect of 
exclusion.  The EU’s efforts to have greenhouse gas emissions from aviation addressed at the 
global level went nowhere when bargaining occurred without the prospect of exclusion, but the 
decision to include aviation in the EU’s Emissions Trading System, thereby providing for 
exclusion, led to the issue being placed on the agenda of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization.   In the negotiations over the Maritime Labor Convention within the International 
Labor Organization, the EU has some influence on the agreement once it started coordinating its 
position, but even then only prevailed on some issues.  Thus the form of regulatory cooperation 
would seem to be an important intervening variable refracting how the EU’s regulatory power 
resources translate into influence. 
 The empirical cases also found variation in the EU’s influence within a particular form of 
regulator cooperation.  In the case of PTAs, the EU’s influence was greatest where its relative 
power was greatest – Central America -- and seems certain to be most limited with respect to its 
peer – the United States.  The EU’s influence on the Maritime Labor Convention increased 
markedly once the member states began coordinating their positions.  Thus within-case variation 
was consistent with explanations in the existing literature.  The form of regulatory cooperation, 
therefore, is an important intervening variable, but it is only part of the story. 
The next three articles present the empirical evidence that has informed this discussion.  
The article by Newman and Posner highlights that the relative regulatory capacity among near 
peers interacts with the degree of international institutionalization to influence patterns of 
regulatory interaction and influence.  Damro’s article wraps up the special issue by developing 
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the concept of Market Power Europe and considering how debates about the EU’s regulatory 
influence inform debates about what type of international actor the EU is. 
  




Bach, D. and Newman, A. L. (2007), ‘The European Regulatory State and Global Public Policy: 
Micro-Institutions, Macro-Influence,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 14:6, 827-46. 
Birchfield, V. (2015), ‘Coercion with Kid Gloves: The European Union’s Role in Shaping a 
Global Regulatory Framework for Aaircraft Emissions,’ Journal of European Public 
Policy,  
Bradford, A. (2012), ‘The Brussels Effect,’ Northwestern University Law Review,  107/1, 1-68. 




Büthe, T. and  Mattli, W. (2011), The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the 
WorldEconomy (Princeton University Press). 
Commission (2007), ‘The External Dimension of the Single Market Review,’ SEC(2007) 1519, 
20 November. 
Conceição-Heldt, E. da and Meunier, S. (2014), ‘Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal 
Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance,’ Journal of 
European Public Policy, 21/7, 961-79. 
Cooper, R. (2012), ‘Hubris and False Hopes,’ Policy Review, 172, 30 March. 
Damro, C. (2012), ‘Market Power Europe,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 19/5, 682-99. 
Damro, C. (2015), ‘Market Power Europe: Clarifications and Contributions.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy. 
Dee, M. (2013), ‘Finding Its Place in the World: Leadership, Power and the European Union,’ 
PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow. 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
23 
 
Dobbin, F., Simmons, B. and Garret, G. (2007), ‘The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social 
Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning?’ Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 449-
72. 
Drezner, D. W. (2007), All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, 
Princeton University Press. 
Dür, A. (2011), ‘Fortress Europe or Open Door Europe? The External Impact of the EU’s Single 
Market in Financial Services,’ Journal of European Public Policy. 18/5, 619-35. 
Groen, L., Niemann, A. and Oberthür, S. (2012). ‘The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen 
and Cancun UN Climate Change Negotiations’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research, 8/2, 173‐191. 
Holzinger, K., Knill, C. and Sommerer, T. (2008), ‘Environmental Policy Convergence: The 
Impact of International Harmonization, Transnational Communication and Regulatory 
Competition,’ International Organization, 62 (fall), 553-87. 
Jørgensen, K. E., Oberthür, S. and Shahin, J. (2011), ‘Introduction: Assessing the EU’s 
Performance in International Institutions – Conceptual Framework and Core Findings,’ 
Journal of European Integration, 33/6, 599-620. 
Kelemen, D. (2010), ‘Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy,’ Journal of European 
Public Policy, 17/3, 335-349. 
Kelemen, R. D. and Vogel, D. (2010), ‘Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the 
European Union in International Environmental Politics,’ Comparative Political Studies, 
43/4, 427-56. 
Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J.S. (2001), Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed, Longman. 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
24 
 
King, D. and Narlikar, A. (2003), ‘The New Risk Regulators? International Organisations and 
Globalisation,’ The Political Quarterly, 74/3, 337-48. 
Kissack, R. (2011), ‘The Performance of the European Union in the International Labour 
Organization,’ Journal of European Integration, 33:6, 651-665. 
Kissack, R. (2015), ;The 4th Pillar of Global Maritime Regulation: EU Influence over the 
Drafting of the Maritime Labour Convention,’Journal of European Public Policy. 
Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2010), ‘Global Regulation,’ in R. Baldwin, M. Cave, D. Lodge (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 406-33. 
Krasner, S. D. (1991), 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,' 
World Politics, 43/3, April, 336-66. 
Jacoby, W. and Meunier, S. (2010), ‘Europe and the Management of Globalization,’ Journal of 
European Public Policy, 17/3, 299-317. 
Laïdi, Z. (2007), ‘The Unintended Consequences of European Power,’ Les Cahiers européene de 
Sciences Po, n˚ 05 (Paris: Centre d’études européenes at Sciences Po). 
Lavenex, S. (2014), ‘The Power of Functionalist Extension: How EU Rules Travel,’ Journal of 
European Public Policy, 21/6, 885-903. 
Lazer, D. (2006), ‘Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in Regulatory 
Policymaking,’ European Law Journal, 12/4, 455-68. 
Mair, M. L. (2008), The regulatory state goes global: EU participation in international food 
standard-setting by the Codex Alimentarius Commission,’ paper to  the GARNET 
conference on “The European Union in International Affairs”, Institute for European 
Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, April 24-26. 
McCormick, J. (2007), The European Superpower (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
25 
 
Müller, P. and Falkner, G. (2014), ‘The EU as a policy exporter? The conceptual framework,’ in 
G. Falkner and P. Müller (eds.), EU Policies in a Global Perspective: Shaping or Taking 
International Regimes? London: Routledge, 1-19. 
Müller, P., Kudrna, Z. and Falkner, G. (2014), ‘EU-Global Interactions: Policy Export, Import, 
Promotion and Protection,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 21/8, 1102-19. 
Newman, A. L. (2008), Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Personal Data in the Global 
Economy, Cornell University Press. 
Newman, A. L. and Posner, E. (2015), ‘Putting the EU in Its Place: Influence Strategies and the 
Global Regulatory Context,’ Journal of European Public Policy 
Oberthür S. (2011), ‘The European Union’s Performance in the International Climate Change 
Regime,’ Journal of European Integration, 33/6, 667-682 
Oberthür, S. and Rabitz, F. (2014), ‘On the EU’s Performance and Leadership in Global 
Environmental Governance: The Case of the Nagoya Protocol,’ Journal of European 
Public Policy, 21/1, 39-57. 
Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: 
Achievements and Challenges’ The International Spectator 43(3), 35-50 
Orbie, J. (2011), ‘Promoting Labour Standards through Trade: Normative Power or Regulatory 
State Europe,’ in R. G. Whitman (ed.), Normative Power Europe: Empirical and 
Theoretical Perspectives, PalgraveMacmillan, 160-83. 
Porter, T. (2011), ‘Transnational Policy Paradigm Change and Conflict in the Harmonization of 
Vehicle Safety and Accounting Standards,’ in G. Skogstad (ed.), Policy Paradigms: 
Transnationalism and Domestic Politics, University of Toronto Press, 64-90. 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
26 
 
Posner, E. (2009), ‘Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at 
the Turn of the Millennium,’ International Organization, 63/4, 665-99. 
Princen, S. (2004), ‘Trading Up in the Transatlantic Relationship,’ Journal of Public Policy, 
24/1, 127-44. 
Putnam, R. D. (1988), 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,' 
International Organization, 42/3. 
Quaglia, L. (2014a), ‘The Sources of European Union Influence in International Financial 
Regulatory Fora,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 21/3, 327-45. 
Quaglia, L. (2014b), ‘The European Union, the USA and International Standard Setting by 
Regulatory Fora in Finance,’ New Political Economy, 19/3, 427-44.  
Sapir, A. (2007), ‘Europe and the Global Economy,’ in A. Sapir (ed), Fragmented Power: 
Europe and the Global Economy (Brussels: Bruegel), 1-20. 
Scott, J. (2014). ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law,’ American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 62/1, 87-125. 
Selin, H. and VanDeveer, S. D. (2006), ‘Raising Global Standards: Hazardous Substances and E-
Waste Management in the European Union,’ Environment, 48/10, 6-17. 
Simmons, B. A. (2001), ‘The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital 
Market Regulation,’ International Organization, 55/3,  589-620. 
Smith, M. P. (2010), ‘Single Market, Global Competition: Regulating the European Economy in 
a Global Economy,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 17/7, 936-53. 
Tortell, L., Delarue, R. and Kenner, J. (2009), ‘The EU and the ILO Maritime Labour 
Convention,’ in J. Orbie and L. Tortell (eds), The European Union and the Social 
Dimension of Globalization: How the EU influences the World, Routlege: 113-30. 
A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
27 
 
van Schaik, L. G. (2013), EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More than 
the Sum of Its Parts? Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vogel, D. (1995), Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy, 
Harvard University Press. 
Vogel, D. (2012), The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental 
Risks in Europe and the United States, Princeton University Press. 
Young, A. R. (2002), Extending European Cooperation: The European Union and the ‘New’ 
International Trade Agenda, Manchester University Press. 
Young, A. R. (2003), ‘Political Transfer and “Trading Up”: Transatlantic Trade in Genetically 
Modified Food and US Politics,’ World Politics, 55/4, 457-84. 
Young, A. R. (2014), ‘Europe as a Global Regulator? The Limits of EU Influence in 
International Food Safety Standards,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
Young, A. R. (2015), ‘Liberalizing Trade, Not Exporting Rules: The Limits to Regulatory 
Coordination in the EU’s “New Generation:” Preferential Trade Agreements,’ Journal of 
European Public Policy 
Young, A. R. and Peterson, J. (2014), Parochial Global Europe: 21
st
 Century Trade Politics, 
Oxford University Press. 
Young, A. R. and Wallace (2000), Regulatory Politics in the Enlarging European Union: 
Weighing Civic and Producer Interests, Manchester University Press. 




A.R. Young  Context and Comparison 
28 
 
















Getting states change to their policies 
to harmonize with EU rules 
to align with international standards  
to mitigate rule clashes 
Shaping multilateral agreements/international standards after its own rules 
Blocking rival standards in multilateral fora 
Changing the positions of key states in multilateral negotiations 
Setting the agenda in multilateral negotiations 
Foreign firms’ changing their global practices in line with EU requirements 




 Table 1 Variation in key variables across cases 
Case Subcases Form of interaction 
Relative power 





















Power based with exclusion  Very strong Somewhat ambitious Weak convergence 
Singapore Power based with exclusion  Very strong Somewhat ambitious Weak convergence 
Korea Power based with exclusion  Strong Somewhat ambitious Limited convergence 
Canada Power based with exclusion  Strong Moderate Very limited rule 
change 































r Before EU 
coordination 
Rule-mediated  None Divided None  
After EU 
coordination 
Rule-mediated Modest Moderate Limited on 
international agreement 
 
 
 
 
